IRAN : simultaneous explosions and fires across the country

equinoxenews
3 days ago
5 min read

On 31 January 2026, multiple explosions and fires were reported across Iran, triggering intense information activity and rapid international media coverage. The reported incidents affected both urban areas and sensitive sectors (port and industrial zones), prompting questions and speculation regarding their origin. At this stage, Iranian authorities have favored accidental explanations, primarily domestic gas leaks, while issuing targeted denials in response to rumors of sabotage or an external attack. However, the near-simultaneity of certain incidents and their geographical distribution have sustained a climate of doubt, amplified by social media. These events unfolded within a tense regional security context, shaped by the aftermath of the Israeli–Iranian confrontation the previous summer and by persistent instability in parts of western and southern Iran. In this context, it is essential to clearly distinguish between confirmed events, unsubstantiated reports, and speculative hypotheses.

Main locations of explosions reported in Iran on 31 January 2026 | CLICK TO ENLARGE |

Factual elements available as of 31 January 2026

Information cross-checked at this stage makes it possible to identify two major, clearly established events, while the remaining reports largely fall within a significant and sometimes contradictory information noise.

The first confirmed incident occurred in Bandar Abbas, Iran’s main southern port and a strategic logistics hub on the Strait of Hormuz. A powerful explosion struck a residential building, causing partial structural collapse and significant damage in the immediate vicinity. The human toll includes at least one fatality, a four-year-old child, and more than a dozen injured. Local authorities quickly put forward the hypothesis of a gas leak, a version echoed by state media. This explanation was nevertheless challenged by some witnesses, who claimed that the building was not connected to the gas network, although these assertions cannot be independently verified at this stage.

A second major incident was recorded in Ahvaz, in Khuzestan province, a region sensitive both industrially and from a security standpoint. Here again, a deadly explosion hit a residential building, resulting in multiple fatalities and injuries. Iranian authorities communicated in a similar manner, attributing the incident to an accidental cause without providing detailed technical information. No operational link between the two explosions has been officially acknowledged.

Alongside these two confirmed incidents, numerous secondary reports circulated across several Iranian cities, notably Parand, Qom, Tabriz, Shiraz, as well as on Qeshm Island. These reports referred to columns of smoke, sounds of detonations, or localized fires. In most cases, local authorities denied the occurrence of explosions, citing vegetation fires, burning waste, minor industrial incidents, or other non-critical phenomena. In Shiraz, a persistent rumor suggested the possible crash of a jet aircraft, an allegation that remains unconfirmed and has not been supported by any credible official communication.

Finally, several rumors circulated alleging the targeting of facilities belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or Iranian military officials. These claims were firmly denied by sources close to the Iranian authorities. For their part, Israeli officials also denied any involvement in the events, through diplomatic channels relayed by the international press.

Analysis and hypotheses

At this stage, the overall picture remains dominated by a partial certainty: two fatal explosions (Bandar Abbas and Ahvaz) are documented and acknowledged, while the remainder of the reported “incident landscape” reflects a combination of heterogeneous facts, administrative reclassifications (waste or vegetation fires), and online overinterpretation. It is precisely this combination — hard facts plus informational fog — that opens the way to several competing interpretations.

Hypothesis A — Domestic / industrial accidents

The official narrative (gas leaks, non-criminal incidents) is consistent with a classic pattern: residential buildings, localized damage, standard emergency response, and the absence (so far) of any public evidence pointing to a military-grade explosive or external impact. The complicating factor, however, lies in the potential discrepancy between initial official communication and certain eyewitness accounts (e.g., claims that the affected buildings were not connected to the gas network), which weakens confidence in the narrative and fuels alternative hypotheses.

Indicators that would strengthen this hypothesis: publication of a technical report (gas/electrical systems), confirmation of a leak or gas accumulation, evidence of poor maintenance, absence of explosive debris or residues, and consistency between casualty figures and damage patterns.

Hypothesis B — Localized sabotage / internal action

An internal action (criminal, activist, or opportunistic sabotage) remains theoretically plausible, particularly in a country where socio-political and security tensions can create windows of opportunity. This hypothesis is reinforced by the context of violent repression carried out by Iranian authorities against protests in early January, which may have generated internal retaliatory dynamics, whether spontaneous or loosely organized.

That said, at present this hypothesis suffers from a lack of publicly available material evidence: no claim of responsibility, no clear operational signature, and no series of unequivocal attacks targeting homogeneous categories of infrastructure (energy, telecommunications, IRGC facilities, etc.). The “near-simultaneity” highlighted online may also reflect an artifact of information virality rather than genuine coordination.

Indicators to monitor: announcements of arrests, televised “confessions,” technical elements from the scene (device type, initiation point), repeated targeting of the same type of infrastructure, a short-term multiplication of similar incidents, and any explicit references to the January protests in official judicial or security discourse.

Hypothesis C — Coordinated external operation

This is the most politically explosive hypothesis, and the one that tends to surface most rapidly in the information space whenever a state is operating under heightened security tension. At this stage, it is not supported by solid public evidence: official denials, absence of visible material proof, and above all the nature of the sites affected — in Bandar Abbas and Ahvaz, residential buildings — which does not align with the most rational modus operandi for an external operation seeking strategic effect while controlling escalation.

Nevertheless, this hypothesis cannot be entirely dismissed in a regional context where certain actors possess recognized expertise in long-range clandestine operations, combining limited kinetic actions, indirect sabotage, and manipulation of the information environment. In this regard, precedents attributed to Israel, including discreet operations conducted beyond its borders — notably technological actions targeting hostile networks in Lebanon in recent years — naturally fuel speculation, without constituting evidence in the present case.

Within this framework, an external action might aim not at immediate military gain, but at an indirect objective: testing Iranian reaction capabilities, assessing the resilience of security services, or achieving information saturation designed to increase psychological and political pressure. In the absence of material indicators, however, this reading remains highly speculative.

Indicators to monitor: ballistic or fragmentation evidence, impact patterns consistent with a munition or external device, convergence of open-source indicators (satellite imagery, geolocation, chronology), simultaneous outages of critical infrastructure, indirect deterrence signals (leaks, coded messages), or implicit claims via proximity channels typically used in clandestine operations.