NIGER : major Islamic State attack on Niamey airport

Fire and ongoing fighting at Niamey Airport / Air Base 101 on 29 January 2026 around midnight

During the night of 28–29 January 2026, Niamey’s Diori Hamani International Airport and Air Base 101 were targeted by an unprecedented jihadist attack, claimed on 30 January by the Islamic State. Carried out in the heart of the Nigerien capital, the assault caused significant material damage and highlighted persistent vulnerabilities in the country’s security apparatus, despite the break with Western partners. Beyond the immediate security shock, the attack triggered a regional diplomatic crisis, with Niamey accusing several neighbouring states, including Benin and Côte d’Ivoire, prompting official responses and a renewed rise in tensions across West Africa.

An unprecedented assault in the heart of the Nigerien capital

During the night from Wednesday 28 to Thursday 29 January 2026, shortly before midnight, the airport area of Niamey, including Diori Hamani International Airport and Air Base 101, was targeted by a complex and coordinated terrorist attack, marking an unprecedented threshold in the operational capabilities of jihadist groups in the Sahel. The fighting continued until around 2:00 a.m., before a gradual return to calm.

Unlike more conventional attacks, the assault combined multiple simultaneous vectors:

• armed groups operating on motorcycles,

• indirect mortar fire,

• armed drones, including suicide FPV drones, used for strike and saturation purposes,

• and direct firefights with Nigerien defence and security forces (FDS).

  
  

This modus operandi reflects a high level of planning, substantial logistical preparation, and a degree of coordination rarely observed so far against such a central and strategic infrastructure.

Combined use of drones and indirect fires

One of the most significant aspects of the attack lies in the simultaneous use of armed drones and mortars. Converging security sources report the employment of suicide FPV drones, likely based on modified commercial platforms, used to:

• strike precise points within the perimeter,

• disrupt command-and-control structures,

• and saturate low-altitude air defence capabilities.

  
  

The mortar fire, for its part, appears to have been intended to maintain constant pressure on the area, complicating the manoeuvre of ground forces and amplifying the shock effect. This air–ground combination suggests a clear intent to overwhelm defensive systems, or at the very least to test their response thresholds.

Implementation of air defense and the role of Africa Corps

Air defence systems deployed on the base appear to have been rapidly activated, as evidenced by several open-source videos showing tracer fire and nighttime interceptions.

Although no official confirmation has been provided, multiple observers have suggested the possible use of short-range surface-to-air systems, potentially of the Pantsir-S1 type or equivalent capabilities, specifically intended for counter-drone operations.

The presence of the Russian Africa Corps contingent at Air Base 101 represents a key factor in this context. Stationed in barracks located in close proximity to strategic facilities, these elements are believed to have supported Nigerien forces during the defensive response, particularly in the areas of protection of sensitive sites, coordination of air defence, and securing storage zones.

While Niamey has not officially communicated on the direct involvement of Russian mercenaries, their presence on site and their known technical capabilities make their participation in the defensive system plausible, at least in a supporting role.

A base with major strategic stakes

Air Base 101 concentrates an exceptional number of high-value strategic assets, shedding light on the likely intentions of the attackers. Beyond the civilian airport, the site hosts the headquarters of the Unified Force fighting terrorism in the Sahel, Africa Corps facilities, and Nigerien Air Force drone hangars, including Turkish-made Aksungur drones, each estimated to be worth several billion CFA francs. Most critically, the base is also reported to store several hundred tonnes of uranium concentrate (“yellowcake”), with a convoy originally destined for Lomé, Togo, still blocked at Niamey on the premises of Air Base 101.

In this context, the attack cannot be reduced to a mere show of force. It may have aimed at targeted destruction of critical capabilities—including drones, logistics, and symbols of sovereignty—an offensive reconnaissance operation intended to probe defensive systems, or a high-impact psychological operation designed to demonstrate the vulnerability of an ultra-sensitive site.

Assessment

Two comparative satellite images of Niamey’s Air Base 101, taken before and after the 29 January 2026 attack, make it possible to identify several instances of visible damage within the military compound itself.

On the image captured prior to the attack, all observed infrastructure—including hangars, logistical buildings and modular shelters—appears intact. The rooftops show no signs of perforation, burning or collapse, indicating a normal operational situation before the assault.

By contrast, the post-attack image reveals significant damage to multiple structures located inside the military perimeter. At least three Bachmann-type modular shelters, integrated within large hangar complexes, display darkened areas and visible roof perforations. These impacts, clearly localized and concentrated on specific infrastructures, suggest targeted and precise strikes rather than diffuse collateral damage. This damage pattern is consistent with the combined use of kamikaze drones and mortar projectiles.

In addition, extensive blackened areas can be observed in several peripheral sectors of the base, corresponding to bush fires caused by subsequent fires. These burn marks may be linked to ground fighting or secondary explosions, although no clearly identifiable direct impact points are visible in these specific areas.

At this stage, the exact condition of equipment and personnel inside the damaged structures remains unknown. However, the concentration of damage on these shelters and hangars, located at the core of Air Base 101, points to a deliberate, planned attack aimed at high-value military targets.

Accusations from Niamey and regional political fracture

In the hours following the attack, the Nigerien authorities' response was not limited to security measures alone. General Abdourahamane Tiani, head of the National Committee for the Safeguarding of the Homeland (CNSP), quickly pointed the finger at external parties, explicitly accusing Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, and France of having, in his words, "organized, supported, or facilitated" the attack on Niamey airport.

These accusations were made despite the official claim of responsibility for the attack by the Islamic State, disseminated through its usual channels on January 30, 2026. This dissonance between the jihadist rhetoric and the official communication from Niamey is a central element of the current situation, revealing a political manipulation of the event.

A deliberate political interpretation of the threat

By blaming neighboring states and a former Western partner, the Nigerien government is shifting its narrative: the attack is no longer presented simply as a terrorist act, but as the product of a regional and international conspiracy aimed at destabilizing the regime in power. This interpretation allows the junta to place the event within a broader framework of geopolitical confrontation, pitting Niger against an environment deemed hostile.

Côte d’Ivoire and Benin occupy a special place in this discourse. Both are perceived by Niamey as coastal states that have remained aligned with Western security arrangements, still hosting foreign forces and cooperating closely with France and other European partners. Their designation as “rear bases” or relays for subversive activities is consistent with a pattern already observed since the border closures and trade tensions, particularly with Benin.

France, for its part, remains a key rhetorical target. Although its forces have left Niger, Paris continues to be presented as a central player in the dynamics of interference, serving as a focal point for a sovereignist discourse widely relayed in the Nigerien media space.

Diplomatic reactions and hardening positions

Tiani’s accusations prompted immediate diplomatic responses. Côte d’Ivoire summoned Niger’s ambassador, denouncing statements deemed unfounded and dangerous for regional stability. Benin, meanwhile, categorically rejected any involvement, recalling its official commitment to counterterrorism efforts and its growing exposure to jihadist violence in its northern regions.

These exchanges reflect an increasingly pronounced political fracture between, on the one hand, Sahelian states governed by military juntas—Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso—and, on the other, the coastal states of West Africa that remain embedded in traditional regional mechanisms, including ECOWAS and Western security partnerships. In this context, the Niamey attack acts as both a revealer and an accelerator of this polarization.

An assumed strategic contradiction

The coexistence of two narratives—a clear jihadist claim of responsibility and state-level accusations targeting foreign powers—is far from incidental. It reflects a deliberate communication strategy by Niamey, prioritizing domestic and regional political impact over factual consistency.

At the domestic level, this posture enables the regime to consolidate support around military authority, divert attention from the security shortcomings exposed by the attack, and justify the strengthening of the security apparatus as well as increased reliance on non-Western partners, particularly Russia.

At the regional level, however, it contributes to weakening cross-border cooperation mechanisms that are nonetheless essential in combating jihadist groups. By replacing coordination with mistrust, this strategy risks creating security grey zones that terrorist organizations could exploit.

Strategic assessment

The Niamey attack therefore cannot be reduced to a mere security shock. It forms part of a broader sequence of political and geopolitical realignment, in which counterterrorism becomes both a tool for regime legitimation and a lever for diplomatic confrontation. By accusing neighbouring states and France despite the Islamic State’s claim of responsibility, the Nigerien regime embraces a politicized reading of terrorism, at the risk of deepening an already severe regional fragmentation. In the medium term, this dynamic may complicate any effective collective response to a jihadist threat that continues to adapt, organize and strike regardless of political fault lines between states.